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AND  CURRENT  POLICY  DEBATES* 
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Almost  seven  years  have  elapsed  since  the  U.  S. 
abandoned  the  moribund  Bretton  Woods  system  of 
pegged  exchange  rates  for  a  regime  of  flexible  ex- 
change  rates.  During  that  time  the  country  has 
experienced  double-digit  inflation,  rapid  currency  de- 
preciation,  mounting  trade  deficits,  and  a  skyrocket- 
ing  price  of  gold.  The  policy  debates  generated  by 
these  events  have  tended  to  crystallize  around  the 
following  questions.  What  caused  the  fall  of  the 
dollar  on  the  foreign  exchanges?  How  can  that  fall 
be  reversed  and  the  currency  strengthened?  Can 
exchange  rate  movements  be  counted  upon  to  correct 
trade  balance  deficits?  Can  currencies  remain  per- 
sistently  under-  or  overvalued  on  the  foreign  ex- 
changes  thereby  justifying  corrective  government 
intervention?  How  is  the  soaring  price  of  gold  re- 
lated  to  exchange  rate  depreciation?  Do  exchange 
rates  and  the  price  of  gold  indicate  how  well  the 
monetary  authorities  are  doing  in  the  fight  against 
inflation  ? 
Bullionists’  Answers  Many  answers  have  been 
given  to  the  foregoing  questions.  Few  commentators, 
however,  have  noticed  that  some  of  the  best  answers 
were  advanced  more  than  170  years  ago  by  the  so- 
called  bullionist  writers  in  the  famous  early  19th 
century  Bank  Restriction  Controversy  over  the  causes 
of the  fall  of the  paper  pound  and  the  rise  in  the  price 
of  gold  following  Britain’s  decision  to  leave  the  gold 
standard  for  floating  exchange  rates  during  the  Na- 
poleonic  wars.  The  bullionists,  whose  ranks  included 
such  luminaries  as  David  Ricardo  (1772-1823), 
Henry  Thornton  (1760-1815),  John  Wheatley 
(1772-1830),  William  Blake  (1774-1852),  Francis 
Horner  (1778-1817),  and  Thomas  Malthus  (1766- 
1834),  were  the  monetarists  of  their  day.  Like 
modern  monetarists,  they  sought  to  refute  the  non- 
monetarist  contention  that  the  fall  of  the  pound  and 
the  rise  in  the  price  of  gold  were  real  phenomena 
that  had  nothing  to  do  with  money.  That  is,  they 
sought  to  refute  the  Bank  of  England’s  contention 
that  the  depreciation  of  the  pound  was  due  to  special 
factors  beyond  its  control,  namely  autonomous  real 
disturbances  to  the  balance  of  payments. 
The  Bank  adhered  to  a balance  of payments  theory 
of  exchange  rate  depreciation.  Similar  to  modern 
government  officials  who  attribute  the  fall  of  the 
dollar  largely  to  excessive  oil  imports  and  the  associ- 
ated  transfer  of  wealth  to  the  OPEC  nations,  the 
Bank  of  England  blamed  the  fall  of  the  paper  pound 
on  extraordinary  food  imports  necessitated  by  do- 
mestic  crop  failures  as  well  as  on  military  outlays 
abroad  and  remittances  to  Britain’s  continental  allies. 
Nothing  was  said  about  money.  By  contrast,  the 
bullionists  blamed  the  fall  of  the  pound  on  the  infla- 
tionary  policies  of  the  Bank  of  England  itself.  They 
contended  that  the  Bank  had  taken  advantage  of  the 
suspension  of  the  gold  standard  to  expand  its  note 
issue  recklessly.  This  overissue  of  money,  they 
thought,  was  largely  if  not  solely  responsible  for  the 
rise in  the  prices  of goods,  gold,  and  foreign  exchange 
experienced  by  Britain  in  the  first  two  decades  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  In  so  arguing,  the  bullionists 
forged  the  links  of  the  monetarist  theory  of  the 
money-price-exchange  rate  mechanism. 
Basic  Analytical  Framework  The  bullionists’ 
basic  analytical  tool  was  the  distinction  between  real 
and  nominal  exchange  rates,  or  what  modern  econo- 
mists  refer  to  as  the  terms  of  trade  and  the  purchas- 
ing  power  parity,  respectively.  According  to  the 
bullionists,  these  variables  constitute  the  two  com- 
ponents  of  actual  quoted  exchange  rates.  The  real 
exchange  rate,  they  explained,  expresses  the  relative 
real  price  of  goods  at  home  and  abroad.  That  is, 
assuming  all  goods  are  traded,  it  expresses  the  rela- 
tive  price  of  one  country’s  output  in  terms  of  the 
other  country’s  output.  Being  a  real  economic  vari- 
able,  it  is  determined  by  real  (i.e.,  nonmonetary) 
factors  such  as  tastes,  technology,  and  resource  en- 
dowments  and,  therefore,  is  affected  by  temporary 
*An  earlier  version  of  this  article  appeared  in  the  Sep- 
tember  10,  1979 issue  of  The  Money  Manager. 
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real  price  of  goods,  it  influences  the  demands  for  ex- 
ports  and  imports,  adjusting  to  bring  the  two  into 
balance.  In  other  words,  it  operates  to  equilibrate  the 
balance  of  payments.  It  possesses  a  long-run  natural 
equilibrium  value  of  unity  determined  by  the  arbi- 
trage  condition  that  the  real  price  of  goods  must  be 
everywhere  the  same  so  that  there  exists  no  advan- 
tage  to  buying  in  one  market  over  another.  Because 
commodity  arbitrage  is  not  instantaneous,  however, 
transitory  departures  from  real  exchange  rate  equilib- 
rium  may  occur  from  time  to  time.  In  particular,  ex- 
ogenous  real  disturbances  to  the  balance  of  payments 
-e.g.,  crop  failures,  unilateral  transfers,  war  and  the 
associated  military  expenditures  abroad-may  cause 
the  real  exchange  rate  to  deviate  temporarily  from  its 
long-run  normal  equilibrium  level.  But  such  devi- 
ations  will  be  automatically  self-correcting  by  the 
feedback  effect  of  the  real  exchange  rate  on  exports 
and  imports.  Thus  a  shock  to  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments  that  depreciates  the  real  exchange  rate  will, 
by  raising  the  relative  real  price  of  goods  abroad  and 
lowering  it  at  home,  act  to  stimulate  exports  and 
check  imports  thereby  equilibrating  the  balance  of 
payments  and  restoring  the  real  exchange  rate  to  its 
equilibrium  level. 
Nominal  Exchange  Rate  In  contrast  to  the  real 
exchange  rate  is  the  bullionists’  concept  of  the  nomi- 
nal  exchange  rate  or  purchasing  power  parity.  A 
purely  nominal  variable  that  has  no  effect  on  real 
economic  variables,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  con- 
sists  of  the  ratio  of  nominal  general  price  levels  ex- 
pressing  the  relative  purchasing  power  of  the  two 
currencies  as  determined  by  relative  demand-adjusted 
money  stocks.  Given  the  foreign  price  level  and  the 
domestic  demand  for  money,  the  nominal  exchange 
rate  varies  solely  with  changes  in  the  domestic  money 
stock.  Unlike  the  real  exchange  rate,  which  is  self- 
correcting,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  can  remain 
permanently  depreciated  as  long  as  the  domestic 
money  stock  is  excessive.  Therefore,  persistent  ex- 
change  rate  depreciation  is  a  sure  sign  of  an  excess 
issue  of  currency.  As  summarized  by  the  prominent 
bullionist  writer  William  Blake  in  1810, 
The  real  exchange  depends  on  the  proportion  be- 
tween  the foreign  payments  which  a  country  has to 
make,  and  the  payments  it  has  to  receive. 
nominal  exchange  depends  on  the  comparative 
value  of  the currencies.  The  real  exchange  has  an 
immediate  effect  on  exports  and  imports.  The 
nominal  exchange,  whether  favorable  or  unfavor- 
able,  has  no  effect  whatever  upon  exports  and 
imports.  The real  exchange  cannot  be permanently 
favorable  or  unfavorable,  whatever  be  the  state  of 
the  currency.  The  nominal  exchange  may  continue 
for  any  length  of  time  favorable  or  unfavorable 
provided  the  value  of  the  currency  continues  to  be 
depreciated.  Now  the  computed  exchange  depends 
upon  the  combined  operation  of  the  real  and 
nominal  exchange.’ 
Blake’s  analysis  can  be  summarized  by  the  equation 
(1)  E  =  RN 
that  expresses  the  actual  observed  exchange  rate  E 
as  the  product  of  its  real  (R)  and  nominal  (N) 
components,  both  of  which  contribute  to  exchange 
rate  movements  in  the  short  run.  In  the  long  run, 
however,  the  real  exchange  rate  is  self-correcting 
(i.e.,  returns  to  its  equilibrium  level)  and  cannot  be 
the  source  of  persistent  exchange  rate  depreciation. 
Only  the  nominal  exchange  rate  can  remain  perma- 
nently  depreciated.  And  since  the  nominal  exchange 
rate  is  determined  by  the  money  stock,  it  follows  that 
persistent  exchange  depreciation  is  a  sure  sign  of  an 
excess  issue  of  currency. 
Policy  Analysis  Having  developed  the  real/ 
nominal  exchange  rate  framework,  the  bullionists 
employed  it  in  their  policy  analysis.  Two  versions  of 
the  framework  were  utilized.  The  strict  version  fixed 
the  real  exchange  at  its  equilibrium  level  so  that  only 
the  nominal  component  contributed  to  exchange  rate 
movements.  By  contrast,  the  moderate  version  per- 
mitted  temporary  movements  in  the  real  component 
of  the  exchange  rate.  On  the  basis  of  these  frame- 
works  the  bullionists  reached  at  least  six  conclusions 
relevant  to  current  exchange  rate  debates. 
Monetarist  Policy  Conclusions  First,  the  fall  of 
the  paper  pound  following  the  move  to  floating  ex- 
change  rates  was  due  entirely  to  excessive  note  issues 
by  the  Bank  of  England.  Real  disturbances  to  the 
balance  of  payments  played  at  best  a  temporary  role, 
producing  transitory  deviations  of  the  exchange  rate 
from  its  purchasing  power  parity  path  dictated  by  the 
nominal  exchange  rate.  Although  the  bullionists 
were  referring  to  such  real  shocks  as  (1)  extraordi- 
nary  food  imports  occasioned  by  domestic  crop  fail- 
ures,  (2)  overseas  military  expenditures,  and  (3) 
remittances  to  foreign  governments,  they  undoubtedly 
would  have  reached  the  same  conclusion  regarding 
the  effect  of  petroleum  imports  and  OPEC  wealth 
transfers  on  the  depreciation  of  the  dollar.  They 
would  have  argued  that,  in  the  long  run  at  least, 
1 William  Blake,  Observations  on  the  Principles  Which 
Regulate  the  Course  of  Exchange  and  on  the  Present 
Depreciated  State  of  the  Currency  (London,  1810;  re- 
print  ed.,  New  York:  Burt  Franklin,  1969),  pp.  86-88. 
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returns  to  its  nominal  path.  That  is,  they  would  have 
pointed  out  that  only  the  nominal  component  of  the 
exchange  rate  can  be  continually  depreciated.  And 
since  that  component  itself  is  determined  by  the 
money  stock,  it  follows  that  the  persistent  depreci- 
ation  of  the  currency,  whether  the  U.  S.  dollar  in  the 
1970’s  or  the  British  pound  in  the  early  1800’s,  is 
basically  due  to  excessive  monetary  growth. 
The  bullionists’  second  policy  conclusion  was  that 
monetary  contraction  was  the  only  way  to  strengthen 
the  pound.  Accordingly,  they  advocated  monetary 
restriction  roughly  in  proportion  to  the  depreciation 
of  the  exchange  rate.  If  the  pound  was  depreciated 
five  percent  relative  to  its  pre-Napoleonic  war  level, 
this  was  a  sure  sign  that  the  money  stock  was  five 
percent  in  excess  of  what  it  would  have  been  under 
the  gold  standard  and  should  be  contracted.  Mone- 
tary  contraction  was  all  that  was  needed  to  restore 
the  pound  to  its  prewar  level.  Nonmonetary  policies 
aimed  at  improving  the  real  exchange  by  encourag- 
ing  exports  and  discouraging  imports  are  useless, 
they  thought.  The  real  exchange  rate  is automatically 
self-correcting  and  cannot  be  the  source  of  persistent 
exchange  rate  depreciation.  Only  the  nominal  ex- 
change  rate  can  remain  depreciated.  Therefore,  only 
the  nominal  exchange  rate  requires  correction  by  the 
policy  authorities.  And  this  can  be  accomplished  by 
reducing  money  growth  to  a  rate  consistent-  with  a 
zero  rate  of  inflation.  Were  they  alive  today,  the 
bullionists  would  advocate  a  permanent  reduction  in 
the  rate  of  growth  of  the  domestic  money  stock  as 
the  means  of  strengthening  the  dollar. 
Currency  Depreciation  and  the  Trade  Balance 
The  bullionists’  third  conclusion  was  that  exchange 
rate  depreciation  has  no  lasting  effect  on  the  trade 
balance.  Only  deviations  of  the  real  exchange  rate 
from  its  equilibrium  level  can  influence  the  trade 
balance  and  these  deviations  are  bound  to  be  tem- 
porary.  The  self-correcting  real  exchange  rate  in- 
variably  returns  to  equilibrium.  And  when  it  does, 
actual  observed  exchange  rate  movements  merely 
reflect  changes  in  the  nominal  price  level  and  have  no 
effect  on  the  real  trade  balance.  In  short,  while  devi- 
ations  from  purchasing  power  parity  can  affect  the 
trade  balance,  movements  along  the  purchasing  power 
parity  path  itself  have  no  such  effects.  The  nominal 
exchange  rate  (i.e.,  the  purchasing  power  parity)  is 
neutral  in  its  impact  on  real  economic  variables. 
The  fourth  conclusion  reached  by  the  bullionists 
was  that  persistent  undervaluation  of  the  currency  is 
impossible.  This  conclusion  involved  direct  applica- 
tion  of  the  concept  of  the  self-correcting  real  ex- 
change  rate.  When  the  real  exchange  returns  to, its 
equilibrium,  the  actual  observed  exchange  rate  accu- 
rately  reflects  the  domestic  purchasing  power  of  the 
currency,  i.e.,  the  external  and  internal  values  of  the 
currency  coincide.  Because  the  exchange  rate  tends 
to  conform  to  the  purchasing  power  parity  path  dic- 
tated  by  economic  fundamentals-i.e.,  the  underlying 
monetary  conditions  in  each  country-there  is  little 
need  for  policy  intervention  aimed  at  preventing 
undervaluation.  Some  extreme  bullionist  writers 
(David  Ricardo,  John  Wheatley)  even  denied  that 
the  currency  could  ever  be  over-  or  undervalued,  even 
in  the  short  run.  According  to  these  writers  the  real 
component  of  the  exchange  rate  is  always  in  equili- 
brium.  Therefore  the  exchange  rate  itself  is  always 
at  the  purchasing  power  parity  and  no  corrective 
intervention  is  ever  warranted.  This  argument,  it 
should  be  noted,  implies  that  the  exchange  rate 
plays  no  role  in  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
process.  Indeed,  the  strict  bullionists  argued  that 
international  adjustment  in  response  to  real  shocks  is 
achieved  via  shifts  in  demand  and  alterations  of  in- 
come  and  expenditure  without  affecting  the  exchange 
rate. 
Rising  Price  of  Gold  The  bullionists’  fifth  con- 
clusion  referred  to  the  rising  price  of  gold  that  ac- 
companied  the  depreciation  of  the  pound  following 
Britain’s  1797  move  to  floating  exchange  rates.  They 
concluded  that  the  cause  of  the  rise  in  the  sterling 
price  of  gold  was  the  Bank  of  England’s  inflationary 
overissue  of  notes,  the  same  factor  responsible  for 
the  rise  in  the  paper  pound  price  of  all  goods  and 
foreign  currencies.  They  pointed  out  that  under 
floating  exchange  rates  the  price  of  gold  is  deter- 
mined  by  the  quantity  of  paper  money  bidding  for 
that  precious  metal.  Thus  the  rise  in  the  paper 
pound  price  of  gold  meant  that  a  larger  quantity  of 
pound  notes  was  bidding  for  the  fixed  world  stock  of 
gold.  They  were  careful  to  note,  however,  that  gold 
was  not  selling  at  a  premium  abroad.  In  particular, 
they  pointed  out  that  while  the  sterling  price  of  gold 
had  advanced  sharply,  its  price  in  terms  of  stable 
(noninflated)  Dutch  guilders  had  remained  relatively 
flat.  They  used  this  argument  to  refute  the  Bank  of 
England’s  contention  that  the  rising  sterling  price  of 
gold  had  nothing  to  do  with  overissue  of  notes  but 
instead  reflected  a  shortage  of  gold  caused  by  an 
increasing  world  gold  demand  for  a  fixed  world  gold 
supply.  The  Bank’s  contention,  which.  implied  a 
universal  rise  in  the  price  of  gold,  was  effectively 
refuted  by  the  bullionists  who  presented  evidence  of  a 
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Thus  the  rise  in  the  domestic-  but  not  the  foreign- 
currency  price  of  gold  reflected  an  overissue  of  paper 
pounds  rather  than  a  world  shortage  of  gold.  From 
this,  the  bullionists  concluded  that  money  growth 
in  Britain  had  been  excessive  relative  to  money 
growth  abroad.  Were  the  bullionists  alive  today, 
they  undoubtedly  would  point  out  that  although  the 
price  of  gold  in  dollars  has  skyrocketed,  its  price  in 
terms  of  stable  Swiss  francs  has  until  very  recently 
remained  relatively  flat.  And  they  would  conclude 
from  this  that  money  growth  in  the  U.  S.  has  been 
excessive  relative  to  money  growth  in  Switzerland. 
Indicators  of  Monetary  Policy  Finally,  the  bul- 
lionists  concluded  that  the  state  of  the  exchanges  and 
the  price  of gold  together  constituted  the  best  existing 
indicators  of the  ease  or  tightness  of  monetary  policy. 
Exchange  depreciation  and  a  rise  in  the  price  of  gold 
signified  that  money  was  excessive  and  should  be 
contracted.  Conversely,  exchange  appreciation  and 
a  falling  price  of  gold  signified  tight  money.  Al- 
though  the  bullionists  considered  other  potential  indi- 
cators  of  monetary  policy,  they  rejected  them  as 
inferior  to  the  exchange  rate  and  the  price  of  gold. 
For  example,  they  rejected  the  general  price  level 
as  an  indicator  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  not  readily 
measurable  (price  index  numbers  being  little  known 
at  the  time).  Similarly,  they  rejected  the  money 
stock  as  an  indicator  on  the  grounds  that  money 
stock  information  was  incomplete,  inaccurate,  and 
unavailable,  and  moveover,  that  it  failed  to  capture 
the  money  demand  factor  influencing  inflation  and 
therefore  was  an  inadequate  measure  of  monetary 
policy.  By  contrast,  the  exchange  rate  and  the  price 
of  gold  are  both  readily  available  and  embody  all  the 
monetary  conditions  producing  inflation.  As  such, 
they  were  accepted  as  the  best  existing  indicators  of 
how  well  the  monetary  authorities  were  doing. 
This  conclusion  has  relevance  today  when  financial 
innovation  and  interest  rate  ceilings  are  distorting  the 
monetary  aggregates  in  unknown  ways,  thereby 
making  it  difficult  to  judge  whether  monetary  policy 
is  tight  or  easy.  In  such  situations,  when  the  mone- 
tary  aggregates  are  giving  conflicting  and  confusing 
signals,  the  authorities  might  well  consider  watching 
the  exchange  rate  and  the  price  of  gold. 
Current  Relevance of Bullionists’ Doctrines  The 
preceding  has  examined  the  exchange  rate  doctrines 
of  the  early  19th  century  bullionist  writers.  What 
were  they  trying  to  tell  us  and  how  do  their  doctrines 
apply  today?  Their  main  message  was  that  persistent 
exchange  rate  depreciation  is  primarily  a  monetary 
phenomenon.  Temporary  real  shocks  have  at  best  a 
transitory  impact  on  the  exchange  rate  while  perma- 
nent  real  shocks  are  likely  to  be  dominated  by  mone- 
tary  disturbances.  Persistent  exchange  rate  move- 
ments  are  for  the  most  part  dictated  by  monetary 
factors  determining  the  nominal  exchange  rate  rather 
than  by  real  factors  determining  the  real  exchange 
rate.  If  the  bullionists’  analysis  is  at  all  correct,  then 
it  follows  that  the  post-1976  fall  of  the  dollar  stems 
primarily  from  monetary  causes  and  requires  a mone- 
tary  cure,  namely  putting  the  domestic  money  stock 
on  a  permanent  noninflationary  path.  On  this  point 
the  bullionists  were  in  perfect  agreement  with  their 
modern  monetarist  counterparts. 
Monetary Approach to Exchange  Rates  That  the 
bullionists  advocated  monetarist  policy  prescriptions 
is  not  surprising  considering  that  they  anticipated 
much  of  the  modern  monetarist  analysis  of  exchange 
rates.  This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  the  older  and 
modern  versions  are  identical.  On  the  contrary,  the 
modern  version  contains  a  crucial  element  missing 
from  the  older  version,  namely  an  analysis  of  ex- 
change  rate  expectations,  generally  regarded  as  a 
major  determinant  of  exchange  rate  movements  in 
the  short  run.  The  bullionists  also  lacked  sophisti- 
cated  empirical  techniques  to  rigorously  test  their 
theories.  Nevertheless  they  did  develop,  refine,  and 
coordinate  the  essentials  of  the  modern  monetarist 
analysis  of exchange  rates.  Consisting  of the  quantity 
theory  of  money,  the  purchasing  power  parity  doc- 
trine,  and  the  concept  of  the  self-correcting  real  terms 
of trade,  these  essentials  provide  a powerful  analytical 
framework  capable  of  accounting  for  a  large  part  of 
exchange  rate  movements.  Moreover,  the  bullionists 
applied  their  analysis  to  policy  problems  much  like 
those  facing  us  today.  For  these  reasons  their  advice 
may  still  be  useful.  Finally,  it  is  worth  noting  that, 
although  they  were  unable  to  rigorously  test  their 
doctrines,  recent  empirical  work  offers  some  support 
for  their  theories. 
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